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Abstract 
The paper investigates the effect of vessel specific and market variables on the probability of 
scrapping dry bulk ships of different sizes. Using a 2012-2015 dataset, we find that, the 
probability of scrapping increases with age, but that the relation between vessels size and 
scrapping probability varies across the different segments. That is, the scrapping probability 
is lower for larger vessels in size segments where there is a trend towards building larger 
vessels. In addition, while the relation between earnings and probability of scrapping ships is 
negative, bunker prices seem to only affect the scrapping rate of smaller tonnage. 
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1. Introduction 
The dry bulk shipping market entered a deep and lasting depression after the 2008 financial 
crises with extremely low freight rates for the whole of the dry bulk sector. Historically low 
earnings for different subsectors within the dry bulk market made it difficult for dry bulk 
shipping companies and ship owners to keep vessels in operation and some resorted to 
retiring ships through scrapping. The recurring relapse into successive depression periods 
over the last few years, interrupted only by modest or short-lived recoveries, relates the extent 
of the post-2008 shipping crisis to the crises triggered by the 1929 financial crash and later by 
the oil shock in the 1970s. The scrapping volume in the 1980s marked the second significant 
capacity retirement in the course of the last century; the first was seen in the early 1930s with 
lay-up climbing in both instances to a significant percentage of the fleet (Thanopoulou, 
1995). However, the current shipping crisis lacks a number of typical characteristics of the 
previous major shipping depressions. For instance, there has not been significant lay-up 
activity (Alizadeh et al, 2014) or fleet reduction through scrapping, while, on the contrary, the 
dry bulk fleet continued to grow after 2008 (cf. Figure 1).   
Excluding losses due to accidents, capacity adjustments in shipping takes mainly three forms 
at firm and industry level: a) in the short term the usual way is speed reduction b) in the 
medium-term firms resorted traditionally to lay-up, and c) in the long-term, firms resorted 
historically to scrapping. In the first two cases, the capacity adjustment is temporary and 
reversible while in the latter case it is permanent. In addition, the decision to scrap can be 
triggered only by a prolonged recession with no prospect of market recovery, or due to 
regulatory changes - as was the case with the compulsory vessel withdrawal after the Oil 
Pollution Act 1990 - and obsolescence. Otherwise, firms tend to keep the vessel operating or 
laid-up until maintenance and repair costs exceed economical levels. 
In a market downturn, not all vessel size segments are affected in the same way because 
shipping firms operating in different sectors and sub-sectors might not be under the same 
financial or cash flow pressure. For many shipping firms the deciding factor for vessel 
retirement can be the financial situation often related to the timing of vessel acquisitions and 
to their financial structure. As the crisis deepens and the outlook for recovery worsens all but 
the financially stronger firms start coming under pressure. In this context, rational choices for 
firms in financial difficulty are either: a) lay-up to stop accumulating higher losses at the 
variable cost level including operating expenses and voyage costs, or b) to scrap vessels in 
order to recoup part of the invested capital when liquidity of the firm is low with capacity 
retirement reflecting then cash-flow pressures. 
Recent research suggests that in the context of the current crisis a faster freight rate mean 
reversion has reduced any gain from laying-up the vessel since the related entry and 
reactivation costs carry more weight for shorter than for longer lay-up periods (Alizadeh et al, 
2014). However, scrapping or retirement emerged again in recent years as a response to a 
prolonged depressed freight market, albeit not at the levels necessary to shrink supply as in 
previous crises (cf. Figure 1).  
In this research, we utilize a logit model in order to assess the probability of a dry bulk carrier 
being scrapped depending on vessels’ main characteristics, such as age and size, and market 
specific factors including freight rate level, bunker prices, interest rates, scrap prices and 
market volatility. As expected, the results confirm the existence of a positive relation between 
age and probability of scrapping a vessel across all dry bulk sub-sectors. However, the results 
reveal that the relation between vessel size and scrapping probability can vary across 
different dry bulk segments. In particular, while the state of freight market is inversely related 
to the probability of scrapping, higher bunker prices seem to increase the probability of 
scrapping smaller tonnage. Moreover, market variables such as level of interest rates, scrap 
values and market volatility seem to have a positive effect on probability of scrapping dry 
bulk carriers.  
The paper is structured in five sections. Following the introduction, the second section 
reviews literature on capacity retirement and shipping. Section three discusses data and 
methodology used for this research. Estimation results are presented in the fourth section. 
Section 5 concludes proposing also directions of further research. 
 
2. Literature Review: capacity retirement and shipping  
Shipping is one industry where market structure along with the nature, standardization and 
history of employment terms and contracts, allows maximum flexibility in temporary 
capacity retirement. This is evident in the form of high rates of lay-up during major shipping 
crises in the last one hundred years of modern shipping. A higher proportion of laid-up 
tonnage has been observed both during lengthy shipping crises - such as the world economic 
and shipping depression of the 1930s - and during shorter but deeper recessions, such as those 
in 1958 and the early 1980s (Thanopoulou, 1994). However, in the context of the current 
crisis a number of changes in the characteristics of market cyclicality, expressed through the 
speed of freight rate mean reversion (recovery) together with changes related to shipowner-
charterer relations (Alizadeh et al, 2014), have led to lay-up rates being at historically lower 
levels despite the poor freight rates of recent years. 
Following the seminal work on the lay-up decision by Strømme Svendsen (1956), lay-up and 
scrapping have been discussed together in literature as alternatives for firms during periods of 
low freight rates as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Cockburn and Murray (1992) relate 
capacity retirement to scrapping when modeling the impact of market conditions on tankers. 
The highly cyclical character of the shipping industry adds depth to the finding - for unrelated 
industries - that capital retirement has an inverse relation to the business cycle (Bonleu et al, 
2013). This is corroborated by the historic record of demolition activity in international cargo 
shipping as illustrated in Figure 1. 
However, while of obvious intuitive relevance, the shipping market cycle is an essential but 
not exclusive parameter of the scrapping decision. In other transport industries such as 
airlines it has been found that “the business cycle, the costs of capital, the cost of funds, fuel 
costs and noise regulation” (Goolsbee, 1998, p.493) all affect  the permanent retirement of  
aircraft. In a more recent study, Knapp et al (2008), investigate the impact of new regulation 
about ship recycling coming into force and explore determinants of probability for scrapping 
ships on the basis of a multitude of vessel, market and location specific criteria. They report a 
negative relation between earnings and the probability of scrapping ships, a positive relation 
between scrap prices and scrapping probability, and no significant relation between flag, 
ownership or safety factors and scrapping. While their analysis is quite comprehensive, its 
focus is on scrapping location and covers the period prior to the 2008 crisis when 
shipowners’ seem to have changed their attitude towards capacity retirement compared to 
previous crises.  
A strategy followed by some shipping companies - and occasionally by certain countries in 
the case of state-owned fleets - is the introduction of scrap-to-build schemes, where the main 
objective is to renew the fleet when scrap prices are relatively high and new-building prices 
are relatively low. For instance, in 2010 the Chinese government aimed obviously at fleet 
renewal and support of the national shipping and shipbuilding industries.
1
 Scrap-to-build 
schemes are not a new practice. In the post-war period such schemes had been adopted by 
countries such as Italy and Japan (Odeke, 1984) the former being then much more of a 
maritime power and of a shipbuilding country. Subsidized scrapping schemes have been 
adopted also in the case of fishing fleets although in a different perspective than freight rate 
restoration, as in the case of Norway (Hannesson, 2004). However, while fishing 
sustainability was the main objective of a more recent Scottish government initiative (Curtis, 
2012), the authors later assessed the commonality of both research and owner approaches 
between fishing and shipping. For fishing vessel owners under cash-flow pressures, 
“clearing” part (or all) of urgent financial obligations through vessel demolition was an 
option both for improving short-term liquidity as well as for longer-term capacity planning. 
In the absence of such scrap-to-build schemes, ship scrapping relies solely on market forces. 
In this context vessels may face different probabilities to scrap; and it is important to assess 
which categories of vessels are more obvious candidates for scrapping. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. The econometric model 
At any given time t, the decision to scrap vessel i (Vi,t) can be a function of vessel specific 
factors including age and size as well as market variables such as freight market conditions, 
expected recovery time - when the market is low - and bunker prices. Essentially, in a 
cyclical market, capacity retirement will tend to be temporary unless cash-flow pressures 
make the choice to keep the vessel untenable. Other variables which could influence a firm’s 
decision to scrap a vessel are scrap steel prices, interest rates, market uncertainty, as well as 
firm’s financial and cash flow situation. Interest rates, in particular, reflect the minimum 
opportunity cost or competing returns, while high scrap steel prices can encourage owners to 
retire uneconomical vessels. Hence, we write: 
 
                                                 
1
 The scheme could be added as a variable in the scrapping decision, but it was aimed at Chinese shipping 
companies only and on the condition that the dry-bulk vessel to be replaced was less than 23 years of age 
(Chiu, 2013). 
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where Vi,t is a binary variable which indicates the decision to scrap vessel i=1 at time t or 
keep her operational i=0, Agei,t is age of the vessel i at time t, Dwti is the deadweight of the 
vessel, while FRi,t is freight rate for vessel i at time t, BPt stands for the bunker price at time t, 
and SPt denotes scrap steel price. Finally, IR
*
t is the level of interest rate at time t, Volt is the 
freight market volatility, and Xi,t as variable(s) reflecting financial situation of the firm.
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In the short-term, as shown by occasional recent transactions, demolition price can vary by 
more than 10% within the same period among ship-breaking yards (Chan, 2014). This is 
especially so when taking into account that demolition prices offered to sellers have proved in 
the past to decrease in the presence of many potential candidate vessels for scrap and of low 
scrap steel demand as the case was in the 1980s. It has been hypothesized (Beenstock and 
Vergottis, 1989, p.267; Strandenes, 1984) that total “scrapping is negatively influenced by the 
ratio of secondhand values to scrap prices”. We also model the probability of a vessel being 
scrapped at any given time on operational earnings and operational costs as reflected in the 
freight rates and bunker prices, as well as on the potential effect of vessel size on the cash-
flow situation. Owners of larger vessels will be affected by larger operational losses if they 
continue to operate the vessel at freight rates below variable cost while larger fixed-costs 
remain unrecoverable in a major crisis like the current one. However, economies of scale and 
adaptation to parcel sizes required by charterers (Thanopoulou, 1998) may allow the largest 
units within the size segment to find employment more easily. Hence, it is not clear that the 
larger operational and capital costs causes larger vessels to have a higher probability of being 
scrapped than smaller vessels at the same age.  
Although interest rates have been at their historical low levels in the last few years, 
nevertheless we consider inclusion of interest rates as a cost variable which can affect the 
cash flow of the shipping especially when vessels are financed by debt/loan. Other specific 
factors - such as whether the vessel has been involved in an accident with high repair costs, or 
even technical obsolescence - can also affect the decision to scrap the vessel. However, with 
the impressively declining number of total losses – including constructive ones - in the last 
ten years (Allianz, 2015), this difficult to capture sporadic effect is considered too negligible 
                                                 
2 Since financial situation of shipping firms are generally related to the shipping market condition which 
is reflected in freight rate and bunker prices, and due to unavailability of such information for all shipping 
firms we do not consider firm specific variables in our analysis and model. 
to be a candidate variable. In addition, while the level of maintenance of a vessel can 
influence the economic life and the probability of the vessel being scrapped, we do not 
consider this factor due to the difficulty in having information for each vessel in the sample.  
Since the dependent variable is a binary one, in order to investigate the impact of vessel 
specific factors on the decision to scrap, we specify and estimate a logit model for each year 
of the sample and each class of dry bulk market. The annual logit model is only based on 
vessel specific variables (age and size) which is specified in the following form: 
    
(2) 
 
where is the probability of vessel i sold for scrapping in a given year in the 
sample, considering the information set which includes all vessel specific variables. The 
logit function ensures that the probabilities vary between 0 and 1, while sign and significance 
of the variables can be tested once the model is estimated using an appropriate estimation 
method. The parameters of equation    
(2) can be estimated by maximizing its log-likelihood function, which is defined as: 
 
   (3) 
 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of residuals, is 
the matrix of explanatory variables, and is the vector of coefficients.  
Furthermore, we extend the analysis by specifying a panel logit model by pooling the four 
year (2012- 2015) data and estimating one unbalanced panel logit regression for each sub-
sector of the dry bulk market. The panel logit models includes market variables along vessel 
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specific variables including the freight market, bunker prices, scrap steel price, market 
volatility and interest rates.
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   (4) 
 
where subscript t represents the year of scrapping (t=2012…2015). DFRt denotes the 
deviation of 1 year time-charter rate (as revenue indicator) in year t from  the long-run 
average of 1-year time-charter rate, DBPt  is the deviation of bunker price in year t from the 
long-run average bunker price used as cost indicator in the model, DSCt is the difference 
between scrap price at time t and long run average of scrap prices, Volt is the volatility of 
freight market at time t, and DIR is the deviation of interest rate at time t and its long run 
average.
4
  
 
3.2. Description of the dataset  
The information on scrapped vessels and operational fleet in the different segments of the dry 
bulk market has been sourced from Clarksons Research Ltd and covers the period 2012 to 
2015. The data set contains the size and age of all the vessels, as well as the date on which 
each vessel was scrapped. In addition, operational earnings for each type of vessel, bunker 
prices and scrap steel prices have been collected from Clarksons to be used as operational 
profitability and variable cost proxy variables. The four main segments of the dry bulk 
market are: a) Capesize i.e. vessels with more than 100,000 deadweight tonnes (dwt), b) 
Panamax (vessels of 60,000dwt to 79,999 dwt), c) Handymax/Supramax (40,000dwt to 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that we use the difference of freight rate, bunker prices, scrap steel price and interest 
rates with their long run mean value to reflect the market condition.  
4 We estimated the volatility variable, Vol, using daily Baltic freight indices for different size vessels (Capesize 
4TC, Panamax 4TC, Supramax 6TC and Handysize 6TC). We first estimate the volatility (standard deviation) 
for each day using a one year rolling sample and then calculate the average of the estimated volatilities over 
the year indicated in the model. For instance, we use a rolling sample of 250 observations to estimate the 
standard deviations for every day of 2012, and then calculate the average of standard deviations estimated for 
each day of 2012. 
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59,999 dwt), and finally d) Handysize vessels ranging from 10,000 dwt to 39,999 dwt in 
size.
5
 
The Capesize fleet is employed mainly in the transportation of iron ore and coal, while the 
Panamax fleet is used primarily in grain, coal and to some extent in iron ore transportation. 
The smaller bulk carriers (Supramax/Handymax and Handysize) are more flexible and are 
used for transportation of many different dry bulk commodities such as grain, minerals, 
fertilizers, etc. in various routes around the world (Stopford, 2009).  
Other variables including bunker price, interest rate, and scrap price are also collected from 
Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network. Bunker prices are based on Rotterdam 380cst 
HSFO, interest rates are 1-year Libor, while scrap prices are demolition price for bulk carriers 
in the Far East market. Finally, the volatility of freight market is estimated for each size dry 
bulk ships using daily Baltic freight indices for different size vessels (Capesize 4TC, 
Panamax 4TC, Supramax 6TC and Handysize 6TC). We first estimate the volatility (standard 
deviation) for each day using a one year rolling sample and then calculate the average of the 
estimated volatilities over the year indicated in the model. For instance, we use a rolling 
sample of 250 observations to estimate the standard deviations for every day of 2012, and 
then calculate the average of standard deviations estimated for each day of 2012. 
The statistics of fleet size, scrapping activities and average age for these four dry bulk sub-
markets over the period 2012 to 2015, are reported in Table 1. It can be seen that across all 
vessel sizes the fleet has grown significantly between 2012 and 2015 from 1299, 1294, 2298, 
and 2637 for the Capesize, Panamax, Supramax/Handymax, and Handysize segments to 
1723, 1874, 2934, and 3427 vessels, respectively. The growth is equivalent to respective 
increases of 32.6%, 44.8%, 27.7%, and 29.9% for the Capesize, Panamax, 
Supramax/Handymax, and Handysize sectors, despite the dire freight market conditions 
especially in the first two segments. While there has been a drive from investors placing 
orders for Ecoships to achieve better economic performance, part of the increase in fleet size 
is believed to be due to the overhang of the orderbook from before the 2008 financial crisis.  
                                                 
5 For the purpose of analysis in this paper we apply the main classification of the dry bulk vessels most used by 
the industry. However, the Capesize sector can be classified further into Very Large Ore Carriers (VLOC) 
which includes vessels of over 200,000 dwt, Capesizes from 100,000 to 199,999 dwt, while there exists a 
small fleet of vessels known as Kamsarmax with a size over 80,000 but below 100,000; however, this size 
class of vessels has not yet reached even the 15 years age threshold as it was introduced in the early years of 
the past decade. 
A number of orders have been placed in recent years also on the basis of unjustified optimism 
about an imminent recovery and falling newbuilding prices. 
The statistics in Table 1 also show the number of vessels and percentage of fleet scrapped in 
each segment of the dry bulk sector from 2012 to 2015. In addition, while there has been no 
noticeable change in the average scrapping age and in the average age of the fleet across all 
four different segments, it seems that the average scrapping age is lower for larger vessels 
compared to smaller ones in any single year and for all three years the data cover. For 
instance, the average scrapping age in the Capesize sector was 22.9 in 2012 and 20.9 in 2015, 
while in the Panamax sector the average scrapping age was 28.6 in 2012 and 23.1 in 2015. 
Similarly, the average scrapping age in the Handymax/Supramax sector was 26.5 in 2012 and 
27.1 in 2015. In the Handysize sector, the average scrapping age was 30.1 in 2012 reducing 
to 28.8 in 2015. Furthermore, the percentage of vessels scrapped seems to be relatively higher 
in the Panamax and Handysize sectors compared to the Capesize and Handymax/Supramax 
sectors.  
Table 2 reports the average earnings in $ per day for different size vessels over a longer 
period (1985 to 2011) which includes two of the most severe dry bulk crises -  in the mid-
1980s and in the late 1990s -  along with the average earnings during the  years  included in 
the period  under investigation. As expected, average earnings decrease as the size of the 
vessel gets smaller. For instance, average earnings for Capesize, Panamax, 
Supramax/Handymax, and Handysize vessel are $26,924, $16,077, $12,811 and $10,167 per 
day, respectively, over the sample period 1985 to 2011. Moreover, the long run mean, 
volatility and the deviation from the long-run mean for bunker prices and scrap steel prices 
are presented in the last two columns of Table 2. In general, over the sample period (2012-
2015) under investigation, bunker prices have been above their long-run mean (average over 
1985 to 2011), whereas scrap steel prices have been above their long run mean from 2012 to 
2014, and below the long-run mean in 2015. 
 
4. Empirical Results and discussion 
To investigate the impact of vessel specifics on the decision to scrap, we use a simple logit 
model to estimate the probability of a vessel being scrapped for each vessel size segment and 
each year in the sample, as well as a panel logit model to pool the information across 
different size classes and years. For each year, the number of vessels in each segment 
(Capesize, Panamax, Handymax/Supramax and Handysize) and the vessels which were sent 
for scrap during that year are used to construct the binary variable Vi,t, which takes the value 
of 0 if the vessel is in operation and 1 if the vessel is scrapped during that year. For instance, 
in 2012, the Capesize fleet included 1299 vessels out of which 71 were sent to demolition 
yards across 2012. The constructed dataset is used to estimate equation (2) for each dry bulk 
carrier size class and each year in the sample period.  
Estimation results of the logit model of equation (2) for Capesize bulkers are reported in 
Table 3. It can be noted that the estimated parameters for age and tonnage are significant for 
all years, and as assumed, the probability for scrapping a Capesize vessel increases with 
vessel age.  The latter effect is slightly stronger in the two first years of the sample compared 
to 2015.  The average age of the vessels in the Capesize fleet differs only slightly between the 
years.  The same is true for the average age of Capesize vessels scrapped each year. Contrary 
to what was expected (equation 1), however, within the size class proper, the probability of a 
vessel being scrapped is smaller for larger Capesizes than for smaller vessels in this segment. 
This could be due to the younger age of larger Capesize - rising to the Valemax type of 
400,000dwt - vessels which have been delivered over the past few years.  
Similarly, Table 4 reports estimation results for the scrapping probability for Panamax 
vessels. For this segment, the results are significant and confirm the expected sign of the 
parameters. Hence, the probability increases with vessel age. Within the category, it also 
decreases with vessel size due to the trend towards building larger vessels of this category in 
later years.  From the scatter diagram in Figure 3 we see that there is a clear trend whereby 
younger Panamax vessels are larger than the older ones.  Consequently, the age effect may be 
attributed to both the age proper and size-trend variables. The two remaining dry bulk 
segments, Handymax/Supramax and Handysize, present results as reported in Table 5 and 
Table 6, respectively. 
In addition, the relatively high coefficient of determination measured by McFadden R
2
, in all 
estimated models indicate that the two variables of age and dwt can explain a large part of the 
probability of a vessel being scrapped. This is also in line with the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(1989) test statistic for goodness of fit which compares the fitted expected and actual values 
in deciles. Moreover, the percentage gain indicators reveal that the estimated models tend to 
increase the predictive power of probability model significantly. For instance, in the case of 
Capesizes these are calculated as 53.27%, 39.53%, 27.59%, and 34.58% for 2012, 2013, 2014 
and 2015, respectively. However, for all vessel sizes, the percentage gain tends to decrease 
from 2012 to 2015. 
To increase the efficiency of the model and reliability of the results, we also use a modified 
panel logit regression model, which involves construction of a panel data with two 
dimensions: period and vessels. To this extent, we combine the data over the 4 years and 
construct an unbalanced panel with a dimension of (1723x4) for the Capesize, (1874x4) for 
the Panamax, (2934x4) for the Handymax/Supramax and (3427x4) for the 
Handymax/Supramax segments. The first number indicates the fleet and the second number 
is the year. 
In the panel data regression, we estimate the parameters across all four years, for each of the 
four dry bulk segments as specified in equation (4). This way we can include those variables 
reflecting the market condition and assess the probability for scrapping vessels in each dry 
bulk sub-sector. However, because the panel regression for each vessel class covers only 4 
years, we can include a maximum of 2 annual variables and the constant of the regression to 
be able to estimate the model. Thus, we include: (1) the difference of the current freight rate 
relative to the long-run mean of freight rates for the earlier years, that is, relative to the mean 
of freight rates for 1985-2011, and (2) the current bunker price relative to its mean value for 
the same previous period (cf. Table 2) in the model. 
The results of the panel logit regression for different size classes are reported in 
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Table 7. The results reveal that the estimated parameters for age and size variables are 
significant for all vessel segments with expected signs consistent with previous results in 
literature (Knapp et al., 2008). However, the parameters for the deviation of freight rates 
(DFRt) and the deviation of bunker prices (DBPt) from their respective means seem to be 
different across vessel sizes.  Negative coefficients for the relative freight rate indicate that 
the probability for scrapping falls when freight rates rise above the mean level for all 
segments, as should be expected, although the coefficients are significant only for the 
Capesize and Handysize segments. In addition, significant and positive estimated parameters 
of deviation of fuel prices from the long-run mean for Handymax/Supramax and Handysize 
vessels suggest that fuel prices above the long-term mean increase the probability of vessels 
to be scrapped. Finally, estimated coefficients of scrap steel prices seem to be insignificant in 
all models, with the exception of the Capesize market where it is positive and significant.  
Again, the relatively high coefficient of determination measured by McFadden R
2
, in all 
estimated models indicates that vessel specific and market variable used can explain a large 
part of the probability of a vessel being scrapped. Estimated “percentage gain” statistics of 
40.3%, 35.28%, 28.52% and 26.3% for Capesize, Panamax, Supramax and Handysize 
models, respectively, indicate that models tend to significantly improve the predictive power 
of probability of a vessel being scrapped across different size classes. However, such 
predictability tends to decrease for smaller vessels compared to larger ones.  
Furthermore, we estimate a panel-logit model combining all vessel classes in which vessel 
specific and all market variables are considered. The estimation results reported in the last 
column of Table 7 reveal several interesting points. First, the estimated coefficient of age is 
positive and significant, while estimated coefficient for vessel size (2) is insignificant. This 
is mainly because the respective negative and positive effects of this variable on large and 
small size classes observed before seem to cancel each other. However, amongst variables 
reflecting market conditions, estimated coefficient of freight rate (3) is negative and 
significant as before. The estimated coefficient of bunker price (4) is not significant 
suggesting that overall bunker prices do affect the probability of a vessel to be scrapped, 
which can be attributed to the fact that ship-owners used slow steaming to reduce their 
bunker costs and avoid scrapping vessels over the period examined. Estimated coefficients 
for scrap prices (5), market volatility (6) and interest rates (7) are all positive, significant 
14 
and in line with the theory. Generally, higher scrap prices tend to encourage owners to send 
inefficient ships to be scrapped, while higher interest rates (Libor) can increase cost of debt 
for shipping loans and deteriorate the firm’s cash flow position which in turn can lead to 
firms in difficulty to scrap ships. Finally, increase in market volatility which leads to cash 
flow uncertainty can affect shipping companies’ survival in periods of bad market condition, 
increasing probability of scrapping. In addition, increase in market volatility can directly 
affect the recovery outlook (Alizadeh et al. 2014) and hence increase probability of capacity 
retirement.   
Finally, we use the estimated parameters to calculate and present the probabilities for vessels 
being scrapped depending on the variation of underlying vessel specific and market factors as 
in equation 4. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between vessels age and size for Capesize 
vessels assuming low, medium and high earnings compared to their long-run mean. For 
Capesize vessels the probability of scrapping increases with vessel age as expected and 
shown in Figure 3 (panels b and e). Figure 3, also presents the probability surfaces under 
different market conditions with respect to freight earnings and fuel prices in relation to their 
long-run mean. For instance, panels a, b and c present changes in probability of scrapping a 
Capesize vessel when bunker price is at $500/mt, and 1 year time-charter earnings are at one 
standard deviation below the long run mean ($15000/day),  at the long run mean 
($27000/day) or at one standard deviation above the long-rum mean ($39,000/day), 
respectively. Furthermore, panels d, e and f present changes in probability of scrapping a 
Capesize vessel when the freight rate is at its long-run mean and bunker prices change from 
$300/mt to $500/mt, and $800/mt, respectively. Clearly the probability surfaces rise as the 
bunker price increases indicating that higher fuel prices can affect the decision to scrap ships, 
everything else being constant. 
Similar surfaces for the other dry bulk segments are illustrated in Figures 4-6 below. 
Comparing the surfaces for the different segments, we furthermore see that the probability for 
scrapping rises more slowly for the small Handysize vessels than for the others.  This of 
course is consistent with the significant higher maximum age for the Handysize vessels in the 
current fleet, (cf. Table 1). Comparing the surfaces for the different vessel sizes also indicates 
that smaller Capesize and Panamax vessels have a higher probability of being scrapped than 
larger such vessels at the same age once these vessels reach 19 – 22 years for Capesize and 
21 – 25 years for Panamax vessels.  Contrary to this, the Handymax/Supramax vessels’ 
probability for being scrapped does not vary across vessel size within the group. For 
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Handysize vessels the opposite is true: Larger vessels within this group have a higher 
probability for being scrapped than smaller vessels of similar age. 
Results also show the effect of different levels of bunker prices, reflecting different levels of 
voyage costs.  The results for different bunker prices are inverse of the effect of high, average 
and low earnings.  The differences among the segments   replicate again the effects found for 
different levels of earnings.  This symmetry may indicate that the decisive factor is earnings 
relative to voyage costs as approximated by bunker costs.  
The results largely conform to what was expected in terms of influence of variables on 
probability of vessels being scrapped. However, the results and the model can be used by 
investors and financiers alike for investment purposes and assessment of the viability of a 
shipping investment project, especially when older vessels are considered. For instance, using 
the model one can estimate the likelihood of terminating the project by scrapping the vessel 
for a given set of vessel specific and market factors. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Scrapping has emerged again as a means of capacity adjustment during the current severe 
shipping recession, which has evolved since the financial crisis of 2008 once more due 
mostly to the endemic tendency to overinvest during shipping booms (Haralambides and 
Thanopoulou 2014). The recent deterioration of the markets, especially of the dry bulk ones, 
may result in an even stronger resort to this form of retirement of capacity.  
In this paper we concentrated on assessing the probability of a vessel being scrapped on the 
basis of size and age, taking into account market variables and voyage costs as additional 
variables. As expected, and in line with previous research on the subject, age and vessel size 
are important factors in probability of a vessel being scrapped along with market forces such 
as deviation of freight rate from its long-run mean and excess bunker prices from their long-
run mean. However, empirical results also reveal that the effect of these factors on probability 
of vessel retirement may not be constant within different dry bulk size classes. In fact, in the 
Capesize and Panamax sectors, probability of scrapping seems to decrease for larger vessels 
in these sectors. In the Handysize sectors the opposite is true; that is, larger vessels within this 
group have a higher probability for being scrapped than smaller vessels of similar age. For 
Handymax/Supramax vessels probability of being scrapped does not vary across vessel size 
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within the group. These differences reflect the dynamics of ship size within each dry bulk 
segment, which in turn affects the fleet and scrapping age. For instance, the trend is towards 
building larger vessels in the Capesize and Panamax segment, whereas the opposite trend 
seem to be followed in the Handysize segment.   
Our investigation is of practical importance since dry bulk markets in February 2015 reached 
their lowest point historically as measured by earnings in the last twenty-five years only to 
break this negative record again for the second time as the year was coming to an end (cf. 
Figure 1).  Given the highly volatile nature of the dry bulk market and especially of the larger 
segments, financiers and other external investors can evaluate the likelihood that the fleet 
they are investing in may be scrapped based on vessel specific and market factors through the 
proposed model.  
Future investigation on assessing probability of scrapping dry bulk ships can consider other 
vessel specific factors such as quality of build  - by distinguishing the country and shipyard 
where the vessel is built -  as well as other factors such as the level of maintenance and the 
magnitude of cash-flow pressures if adequate proxies can be constructed.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of age and size of the existing and scrapped fleet for each 
vessel category in the sample 
  Capesize  Panamax  Handymax  Handysize 
2012         
Total fleet  1299  1,294  2,298  2,637 
Scrapped  71  87  78  222 
Proportion scrapped  5.47%  6.72%  3.39%  8.42% 
Ave age of fleet (years)  8.0  11.8  8.6  12.6 
Max age fleet  31.0  35.0  37.0  54.0 
Min age of fleet  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Ave age scrap (years)  22.9  28.6  26.5  30.1 
Max scrap age  31.0  35.0  35.0  50.0 
Min scrap age  15.0  22.0  18.0  18.0 
Average size (dwt)  182,982  73,047  51,832  27,223 
Max size fleet  404,389  79,964  59,888  39,991 
Min size fleet  100,314  60,050  40,009  10,083 
2013         
Total fleet  1,482  1,412  2,628  2,972 
Scrapped  44  68  80  233 
Proportion scrapped  2.97%  4.82%  3.04%  7.84% 
Ave age of fleet (years)  7.6  11.3  8.6  12.2 
Max age fleet  31.0  39.0  38.0  55.0 
Min age of fleet  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Ave age scrap (years)  23.3  27.0  26.9  30.0 
Max scrap age  31.0  39.0  36.0  44.0 
Min scrap age  16.0  10.0  15.0  14.0 
Average size (dwt)  185,617  72,998  52,216  27,793 
Max size fleet  404,389  79,964  59,963  39,991 
Min size fleet  100,314  60,187  40,009  10,036 
2014         
Total fleet  1,569  1,543  2,826  3,228 
Scrapped  25  67  68  149 
Proportion scrapped  1.59%  4.34%  2.41%  4.62% 
Ave age of fleet (years)  7.9  11.2  8.8  11.3 
Max age fleet  30.0  39.0  39.0  56.0 
Min age of fleet  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.0 
Ave age scrap (years)  23.6  25.0  26.8  29.1 
Max scrap age  30.0  39.0  31.0  43.0 
Min scrap age  16.0  18.0  18.0  13.0 
Average size (dwt)  187,374  72,824  52,317  28,345 
Max size fleet  404,389  79,964  59,963  39,991 
Min size fleet  100,314  60,366  40,009  10,036 
2015         
Total fleet  1723  1874  2934  3427 
Scrapped  92  88  67  161 
Proportion scrapped  5.34%  4.70%  2.28%  4.70% 
Ave age of fleet (years)  7.78  9.41  8.93  10.93 
Max age fleet  30.0  38.00  40.00  57.00 
Min age of fleet  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Ave age scrap (years)  20.86  23.05  27.05  28.81 
Max scrap age  30.0  34.00  38.00  40.00 
Min scrap age  15.0  14.00  17.00  16.00 
Average size (dwt)  188,337  71,515  52,463  28,308 
Max size fleet  403,844  79,964  59,963  39,991 
Min size fleet  100,172  60,200  40,009  10,000 
The sample consist of vessel with different carrying capacities (deadweight dwt). The industry’s classification 
of vessels according to size is Capesize (100,000 dwt to 410,000dwt), Panamax (60,000dwt to 79,999dwt), 
Handymax/Supramax (40,000dwt to 59,999 dwt) and Handysize (10,000dwt to 39,999dwt) 
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Table 2: Average 1 Year Time-charter rates for different size dry bulk carriers and bunker prices over the sample period 
 
 Handysize 
$/day 
Handymax 
$/day 
Panamax 
$/day 
Capesize 
$/day 
Bunker Price 
$/mt 
Scrap price 
$/ldt 
Interest rate 
% 
Vol Standard Deviation %   
Handysize    Handymax    Panamax    Capesize 
1985-2011 Mean 10,167 12,811 16,077 26,924 193.81 222.97 4.2     
 SD % 28.0 32.0 36.7 46.0 39.9 35.1 26.9     
 SD $ 2850 4104 5906 12381 77.36 78.25      
2012 Mean 8,233 8,655 9,708 13,749 639.64 373.25 0.69 16% 23% 41% 86% 
2013 Mean 8,104 8,642 10,115 15,811 594.80 369.92 0.41 14% 16% 42% 90% 
2014 Mean 9,015 10,764 12,028 21,778 532.14 298.75 0.33 12% 19% 39% 102% 
2015 mean 6,709 8,116 7,505 9,962 267.80 179.17 2.50 18% 18% 41% 111% 
Deviation from the long run mean 
2012  -1,934 -4,156 -6,369 -13,175 445.82 150.28 -3.58     
2013  -2,063 -4,169 -5,962 -11,113 400.98 146.94 -3.86     
2014  -1,152 -2,048 -4,049 -5,146 338.33 75.78 -3.94     
2015  -3,458 -4,695 -8,572 -16,962 73.99 -43.81 -1.76     
 Freight statistics are based on 1 year time-charter rates for different size vessels, bunker prices are based on Rotterdam 380cts heavy fuel oil, scrap steel prices 
are based on Far East scrap values in $ per metric tonne of light displacement, and interest rate variable is monthly Libor.  Volatilities are estimated  using daily 
Baltic freight indices for different size vessels (Capesize 4TC, Panamax 4TC, Supramax 6TC and Handysize 6TC). We first estimate the volatility (standard 
deviation) for each day using a one year rolling sample and then calculate the average of the estimated volatilities over the year indicated in the model. For 
instance, we use a rolling sample of 250 observations to estimate the standard deviations for every day of 2012, and then calculate the average of standard 
deviations estimated for each day of 2012. 
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Table 3: Estimation results of the logit model for Capesize scrapping 
)1(1)|1Pr(
)(
,
210 ii DwtAge
tti ev
   
Variable        Coeff  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Constant        Β0  -8.510
***
  -10.985
***
  -9.574
***
  -4.053
***
 
  (-7.018)  (-7.918)  (-5.730)  (-5.216) 
Age                Β1  0.538
***
  0.563
***
  0.450
***
  0.350
***
 
  (9.725)  (8.194)  (6.183)  (11.122) 
Dwt               Β2  -2.077
***
  -1.424
***
  -1.425
***
  -2.302
***
 
  (-4.729)  (-3.421)  (-2.972)  (-6.167) 
         
No Observations  1299  1482  1569  1723 
McFadden R
2
  0.618  0.567  0.484  0.500 
Log-Likelihood  -105.165  -85.712  -66.150  -179.416 
SBIC  0.1785  0.1305  0.0984  0.221 
LR statistic  340.465  224.749  124.257  359.292 
p-val  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
         
% Correct  95.17  96.52  97.73  93.390 
% Incorrect  4.83  3.48  2.27  6.610 
Total Gain  5.51  2.28  0.87  3.500 
Percent Gain  53.27  39.53  27.59  34.580 
H-L stat   0.806  2.428  1.879  4.934 
  [0.999]  [0.965]  [0.985]  [0.765] 
 Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method. 
 SBIC is the Schwartz (1978) Bayesian model selection criteria. 
 LR statistic tests the joint significance of all the variables in the model. 
 McFadden R
2
 is measured as the parentage improvement of the log-likelihood of the estimated 
model compared with the benchmark model with no variables. 
 Total Gain indicates the improvement "% Correct" from constant probability (no model) 
specification 
 Percentage Gain indicates the percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
compared to using constant probability (no model) specification. 
 H-L stat is Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test statistic for goodness of fit which compares the 
fitted expected and actual values in deciles. 
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Table 4: Estimation results of the logit model for Panamax scrapping 
)1(1)|1Pr(
)(
,
210 ii DwtAge
tti ev
   
Variable        Coeff  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Constant        Β0  -5.943  4.310  -0.241  -6.042
**
 
  (-1.408)  (1.079)  (-0.075)  (-2.167) 
Age                Β1  0.476
***
  0.257
***
  0.228
***
  0.222
***
 
  (9.538)  (8.857)  (10.451)  (11.057) 
Dwt               Β2  -10.346
*
  -17.515
***
  -9.787
**
  -0.701 
  (-1.943)  (-3.244)  (-2.317)  (-0.194) 
         
No Observations  1294  1411  1543  1874 
McFadden R
2
  0.708  0.528  0.389  0.339 
Log-Likelihood  -93.122  -127.160  -168.374  -234.717 
SBIC  0.160541  0.19566  0.232516  0.263 
LR statistic  451.499  284.793  214.630  240.663 
p-val  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
         
% Correct  95.47  94.83  93.63  92.820 
% Incorrect  4.53  5.17  6.37  7.180 
Total Gain  8.01  3.87  1.94  1.770 
Percent Gain  63.87  42.81  23.30  19.790 
H-L stat   1.662  5.969  9.773  21.078 
p-val  [0.990]  [0.651]  [0.281]  [0.007] 
 Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method. 
 SBIC is the Schwartz (1978) Bayesian model selection criteria. 
 LR statistic tests the joint significance of all the variables in the model. 
 McFadden R
2
 is measured as the parentage improvement of the log-likelihood of the estimated 
model compared with the benchmark model with no variables. 
 Total Gain indicates the improvement "% Correct" from constant probability (no model) 
specification 
 Percentage Gain indicates the percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
compared to using constant probability (no model) specification. 
 H-L stat is Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test statistic for goodness of fit which compares the 
fitted expected and actual values in deciles. 
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Table 5: Estimation results of the logit model for Handymax/Supramax scrapping 
)1(1)|1Pr(
)(
,
210 ii DwtAge
tti ev
   
Variable        Coeff  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Constant        Β0  -12.622
***  -7.226***  -5.004*  -4.019* 
  (-4.284)  (-2.836)  (-1.758)  (-1.656) 
Age                Β1  0.345
***  0.289***  0.260***  0.242*** 
  (10.672)  (10.357)  (9.411)  (9.443) 
Dwt               Β2  6.224  -3.385  -7.504  -8.532
* 
  (1.150)  (-0.693)  (-1.403)  (-1.845) 
         
No Observations  2298  2628  2826  2934 
McFadden R
2
  0.525  0.502  0.462  0.450 
Log-Likelihood  -161.909  -178.496  -172.604  -175.805 
SBIC  0.151017  0.14483  0.13059  0.128 
LR statistic  360.76  365.05  303.15  287.292 
p-val  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
         
% Correct  95.81  96.15  96.59  96.600 
% Incorrect  4.19  3.85  3.41  3.400 
Total Gain  2.23  1.85  1.06  1.060 
Percent Gain  34.68  32.47  23.70  23.750 
H-L stat   3.212  1.818  2.885  3.504 
  [0.920]  [0.986]  [0.941]  [0.899] 
 Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method. 
 SBIC is the Schwartz (1978) Bayesian model selection criteria. 
 LR statistic tests the joint significance of all the variables in the model. 
 McFadden R
2
 is measured as the parentage improvement of the log-likelihood of the estimated 
model compared with the benchmark model with no variables. 
 Total Gain indicates the improvement "% Correct" from constant probability (no model) 
specification 
 Percentage Gain indicates the percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
compared to using constant probability (no model) specification. 
 H-L stat is Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test statistic for goodness of fit which compares the 
fitted expected and actual values in deciles. 
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Table 6: Estimation results of the logit model for Handysize scrapping 
)1(1)|1Pr(
)(
,
210 ii DwtAge
tti ev
   
Variable        Coeff  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Constant        Β0  -9.827
***
  -9.323
***
  -7.856
***
  -9.614
***
 
  (-15.753)  (-18.149)  (-16.053)  (-18.860) 
Age                Β1  0.241
***
  0.215
***
  0.164
***
  0.174
***
 
  (14.017)  (17.184)  (17.041)  (18.735) 
Dwt               Β2  7.241
***
  7.668
***
  5.381
***
  11.153
***
 
  (6.538)  (7.027)  (4.424)  (8.518) 
         
No Observations  2637  2872  3228  3427 
McFadden R
2
  0.446  0.428  0.326  0.381 
Log-Likelihood  -421.717  -466.978  -406.694  -401.846 
SBIC  0.328807  0.322324  0.259488  0.242 
LR statistic  680.11  699.69  394.18  495.311 
p-val  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
         
% Correct  89.65  89.92  92.68  93.130 
% Incorrect  10.35  10.08  7.32  6.870 
Total Gain  5.07  4.37  1.49  2.090 
Percent Gain  32.88  30.23  16.88  23.330 
H-L stat   9.341  13.115  8.706  14.449 
  [0.314]  [0.115]  [0.368]  [0.071] 
 Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method. 
 SBIC is the Schwartz (1978) Bayesian model selection criteria. 
 LR statistic tests the joint significance of all the variables in the model. 
 McFadden R
2
 is measured as the parentage improvement of the log-likelihood of the estimated 
model compared with the benchmark model with no variables. 
 Total Gain indicates the improvement "% Correct" from constant probability (no model) 
specification 
 Percentage Gain indicates the percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
compared to using constant probability (no model) specification. 
 H-L stat is Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test statistic for goodness of fit which compares the 
fitted expected and actual values in deciles. 
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Table 7: Panel logit regression results for different size dry bulk carriers 
)1(1)|1Pr(
),(
,
7,6543210 DIRtVolDSCtDBPttDFRiDwtAge
tti
tiiiev
 
  
Variable        Coeff  Capeszie  Panamax  Handymax  Handysize  All Sizes 
Constant        Β0  -8.183
***
  -2.018  -8.419
***
  -10.906
***
  -7.747
***
 
  (-12.136)  (-1.043)  (-5.528)  (-23.276)  (-24.700) 
Age                Β1  0.429
***
  0.262
***
  0.282
***
  0.193
***
  0.228
***
 
  (19.195)  (19.571)  (19.873)  (34.174)  (52.418) 
Dwt               Β2  -1.986
***
  -8.902
***
  -2.991  7.670
***
  -0.016 
  (-7.883)  (-3.867)  (-1.126)  (13.308)  (-0.101) 
DFR              Β3  -0.112
***
  -0.107
*
  -0.167
**
  -0.441
***
  -0.093
***
 
  (-5.786)  (-1.795)  (-2.158)  (-4.519)  (-5.866) 
DBP              Β4  0.0006  0.00001  0.0015
***
  0.0032
***
  -0.0003 
  (0.781)  (0.017)  (2.632)  (6.123)  (-0.173) 
DSC              Β5          0.006
**
 
          (2.178) 
Vol               Β6          1.007
***
 
          (3.198) 
DIR              Β7          0.212
*
 
          (1.879) 
           
McFadden R
2
  0.549  0.471  0.483  0.400  0.419 
Schwarz criterion  0.157  0.219  0.134  0.284  0.219 
    Log likelihood  -416.319  -648.595  -694.503  -1716.802  -3746.381 
LR statistic  1013.476  1156.449  1296.446  2292.710  5392.981 
p-val  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  0.000 
           
% Correct  95.41  93.77  96.19  91.38  93.54 
% Incorrect  4.59  6.23  3.81  8.62  6.46 
Total Gain  2.97  3.39  1.52  3.08  2.28 
Percentage Gain  39.3  35.22  28.49  26.3  26.09 
Hosmer-Lemeshow stat  4.252  42.046  10.203  29.561  88.269 
p-val  [0.834]  [0.000]  [0.251]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
 The estimated model is specified as a panel-logit, where vi,t=0, 1 indicates the vessel i is scrapped or in 
operation and t is the year (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015).  
 The total number of observations in the panel are 5563, 6123, 10,686 and 12,264, for the Capesize, 
Panamax, Handymax/Supramax and Handysize sectors, respectively. 
 Dwt is the deadweight tonnage scaled by 100,000, DFR is the difference between 1 year TC for vessel 
type in year t and long term average of 1 year TC (from 1985 to 2011), DBP is the difference between 
bunker price in year t and long term average bunker price (from 1985 to 2011), DSC is the difference 
between scrap prices in year t and long run scrap prices (1985-2011), DIRt is the level of interest rate 
in year t and the long run LIBOR (1985-2015), and Volt is the volatility of freight market  in year t.. 
 Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood method. 
 LR statistic tests the joint significance of all the variables in the model. 
 McFadden R2 is measured as the parentage improvement of the log-likelihood of the estimated 
model compared with the benchmark model with no variables. 
 Total Gain indicates the improvement "% Correct" from constant probability (no model) specification. 
 Percentage Gain indicates the percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
compared to using constant probability (no model) specification. 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow (1989) test statistics of goodness-of-fit compares the fitted expected values to the 
actual values in deciles. 
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Figure 1 Bulk carrier earnings, demolition and fleet development 1990-2015(Oct) 
 
Source: Data from Clarksons (2015)  
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Figure 2: Age and size distribution of different segments of the dry bulk carrier fleet in 
2012 and 2015 
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 The industry classification of vessels according to size is Capesize (100,000 dwt to 410,000dwt), 
Panamax (60,000dwt to 80,000dwt), Handymax/Supramax (40,000dwt to 60,000 dwt) and Handysize 
(10,000dwt to 40,000dwt). 
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Figure 3: Probability of scrapping Capesize vessels for different age, dwt and freight rate levels 
The probability of a Capeszie vessel being scrapped for different levels of 1 Year TC earnings when bunker price is $500/mt 
a) Earnings at $15,000/day b) Earnings at $27,000/day (long run mean level) c) Earnings at $39,000/day 
   
 
The probability of a Capesize vessel being scrapped for different bunker prices when 1 year TC earnings is at its average long run mean ($26,924/day) 
d) Bunker prices at $300/mt e) Bunker prices at $500/mt f) Bunker prices at $800/mt 
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Figure 4: Probability of scrapping Panamax vessels for different age, dwt and freight rate levels 
The probability of a Panamax vessel being scrapped for different levels of 1 Year TC earnings when bunker price is $500/mt 
a) Earnings at $10,000/day  b) Earnings at $16,000/day (historical mean) c) Earnings at $22,000/day  
   
 
The probability of a Panamax vessel being scrapped for different bunker prices when 1 year TC earnings is at its average long run mean ($16,077/day) 
d) Bunker prices at $300/mt  e) Bunker prices at $500/mt  f) Bunker prices at $800/mt  
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Figure 5: Probability of scrapping Handymax/Supramax vessels for different age, dwt and freight rate levels 
The probability of a Handymax vessel being scrapped for different levels of 1 Year TC earnings when bunker price is $500/mt 
a) Earnings $9,000/day below the historical mean level b) Earnings at the historical mean level ($13,000/day) c) Earnings $17,000/day above the historical mean level 
   
 
The probability of a Handymax vessel being scrapped for different bunker prices when 1 year TC earnings is at its average long run mean ($12,811/day) 
d) Bunker prices at $300/mt e) Bunker prices at $500/mt f) Bunker prices at $800/mt 
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Figure 6: Probability of scrapping Handysize vessels for different age, dwt and freight rate levels 
The probability of a handy size vessel being scrapped for different levels of 1 Year TC earnings when bunker price is $500/mt 
a) Earnings $7,000/day below the historical mean level b) Earnings at the historical mean level ($10,000/day) c) Earnings $13,000/day above the historical mean level 
 
  
The probability of a handy size vessel being scrapped for different bunker prices when 1 year TC earnings is at its average long run mean 
($10,167/day) 
d) Bunker price at $300/mt above the long run mean e) Bunker price at $500/mt above the long rum mean f) Bunker price at $800/mt above the long rum mean 
 
  
 
 
 
 
